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This edited collection brings together chapters by sociologists, political scientists, 
historians and legal specialists who consider how contemporary cultural and 
religious diversity challenges and redefines national constitutional and legal 
frameworks and concepts and how these frameworks and concepts – spontaneously 
or under social pressure and/or prompting from the European Court of Human 
Rights – respond to this diversity in the highly sensitive and topical sphere of 
education.
The Scope of the Book
Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe
The approach adopted in the book is multidisciplinary and comparative because 
legal solutions are impossible to understand independently of the sociological, 
political and historical contexts in which and for which they are adopted. Moreover, 
the broader European context cannot be ignored. Human rights develop under 
the watch of judges from the European Court of Human Rights and positions 
taken in other countries may impact sociologically on the support afforded to 
given national positions. The contributions deal mainly with Western Europe: 
specifically England and Wales, Northern Ireland, France, Germany and Spain. If 
multicultural societies in Western Europe have all been faced with the challenges 
of accommodating minority religious communities,2 the responses chosen to meet 
those challenges have varied greatly, with the most striking differences arising in 
the context of education.
However, a common trend has been the emergence of a human rights discourse 
in which law and religion issues are now being phrased in terms of ‘religious 
1 I would like to thank Frank Cranmer (Cardiff Law School), Dr Russell Sandberg 
(Cardiff Law School) and Prof. Martine Cohen (CNRS Paris) for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this chapter. Any errors remain mine.
2 Kymlicka 1995.
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freedoms’.3 Whatever their legitimate interest in upholding their particular 
traditions – systemic legal coherence, constitutional integrity and values – States 
must acknowledge the individual dimension of religion as a freedom belonging 
to each of us.4 In England and Wales, particular protections used to be afforded 
on grounds of religion prior to the Human Rights era but these owed more to 
‘the tradition of religious tolerance and accommodation than to any sophisticated 
notion of religious liberty as a widespread positive right’ (Hill Chapter 15, 
Sandberg Chapter 16).
Despite starkly diverging traditions and approaches, European countries 
unite around article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 
9 paragraph 1 proclaims religious freedom as a right belonging to each of us: 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.’ Once litigants have proved 
that there has been an interference with the manifestation of their religion or 
belief under article 9(1), the onus is then on the State to demonstrate that the 
interference was justified under article 9(2). To that end, paragraph 2 promotes a 
case by case approach designed to assess whether or not the interference, proven 
to be prescribed by law and pursuing a legitimate aim, does on the facts of the 
case respond to a pressing social need and is proportionate to the aim pursued. 
McCrudden (2011) rightly states that the Human Rights Act 1998 has produced ‘a 
shift in British constitutional thinking, in which pragmatic empiricism has been 
supplemented, if not replaced, by a constitutional idealism that focuses much 
more on principles’. And yet, the emphasis that is placed on the justification stage 
under article 9(2) will lead inevitably and gradually to a balancing process which 
requires a careful weighing up of all the circumstances of a particular case and 
the exclusion of decisions based on principle.5 All European States are therefore 
in that sense encouraged to move towards a more individualistic and more 
factually based approach. The same conclusion applies under the framework of the 
European union, more specifically under the EU directive 2000/78/EC prohibiting 
discrimination at work on the ground, inter alia, of religion. More generally, it 
has been said that ‘the overall picture in the European union is one of balance 
between religious and secular influences which is struck in differing ways in the 
various Member States’ (McCrea 2010).6
The principle of equality, emerging as a paramount principle in law and 
religion matters, has come to protect individual self-identity through judicial 
3 Bradney 2000.
4 Cf. underlying the importance of freedom of religion, ECtHR 20 September 1994 
Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, JCP 1995.I.3823; RTDH 1994, 441.
5 For a similar methodological evolution in the context of privacy, Fedtke, Hunter-
Henin and O’Cinneide 2005.
6 Emphasis added.
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activism rather than economically disadvantaged groups through legislative 
redress (McCrudden Chapter 6). In turn, this individual focus, combined with 
the multiplicity of prohibited grounds of discrimination, has generated conflicts 
between the different grounds of non-discrimination as well as between freedom 
of religion under article 9 of the European Convention and non-discrimination 
claims, to be resolved by litigation. McCrudden (Chapter 6) concludes that 
‘clashes of principle appear more likely to result in rules having to be introduced 
to attempt to resolve them, leading to greater inflexibility when the individual 
case is considered’. But these conflicts may also be read as an encouragement 
for a case by case analysis, in order to ascertain in each case the exact gravity of 
and justification for the alleged interferences. Overall, the general methodological 
trend seems, therefore, to be in favour of an individually and factually focused 
reasoning.
But changes in methodology are slow. English judges, for example, do not 
always carry out a proper assessment of the proportionality test required by 
European case law. Instead, they sometimes make a priori judgments about the 
extent to which schools should be allowed to discriminate rather than carrying 
out a careful examination of the merits of each case (Vickers Chapter 4, Sandberg 
Chapter 16); and one can occasionally read crude dismissive statements as to the 
existence of infringements under article 9(1) of the European Convention, again 
irrespective of the merits of the case (Hill Chapter 15, Sandberg Chapter 16). 
Similarly, the case law of German courts on issues of anti-discrimination law 
under the Eu directive is still lacking in sophistication and nuance (Lock Chapter 
17). Paragraph 23 of the Directive 2000/78/EC, under which discrimination is 
only allowed in ‘very limited circumstances’ would require more attention to 
the facts of each individual case than is currently displayed (Lock Chapter 17). 
From a comparative perspective, the observation is therefore one of slow and 
methodological convergence, by contrast to the harmonization endeavours at 
work in other legal fields.7 The goal is not, therefore, to create a new and different 
model for Europe8 nor to ascertain what model would be the best one for Europe,9 
but to make sure that each national model evolves in a way that is respectful of 
religious freedoms. This modest scope in comparative terms avoids numerous 
pitfalls. Instead of approximating national laws or bringing them closer together, 
promoting a ‘unique’ model for Europe may actually create new divergences and 
reinforce nationalistic reactions (Sefton-Green 2010). How could we identify the 
best model for Europe? It is assumed that the best national model would be one 
that most serves multiculturalism (Modood 2010). But if imposed as a paradigm 
for the whole of Europe, the most multiculturalism-friendly national model may 
(ironically) affect multiculturalism adversely since it may cause potential damage 
7 Sefton-Green 2010.
8 Beck and Giddens 2006.
9 Cf. presenting ‘moderate secularism’ as a model for multicultural European 
societies, Modood 2010.
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in terms of a ‘welfare loss caused by legal rules that are less or not at all tailored to 
national and cultural preferences’ (Van Dam 2009, Sefton-Green 2010). Moreover, 
the quest for the ‘better’ national model for the relationship between law and 
religion may often be characterized by cultural insensitivity. As often seen in 
other contexts with ‘better law’ projects,10 a particular standpoint (influenced by 
a single, often idealized, system or solution) tends to work as a filter for analysis 
of all national models. unsurprisingly, the national system or rule used as a prism 
then turns out to be the winner because, inevitably, it will be the best one to fit the 
chosen mould of analysis. Possibly aware of these pitfalls, the European Court of 
Human Rights has shown at least a degree of deference to national traditions in 
matters of religion at school.
Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe
Religious freedoms vary in scope and meaning according to the national context 
in which believers or non-believers wish to exercise their freedom of (or 
freedom from) religion, because of the margin of appreciation recognized by the 
European Court of Human Rights to member States in deciding on the best way 
to accommodate religious freedoms.11 Tensions between a systemic approach, 
sensitive to States’ heritages and legal frameworks, and an individual approach, 
more attuned to individual rights and beliefs, are now at the heart of law and religion 
issues in Europe. Within this tension between state and individual reasoning an 
added complication (or enrichment) stems from claims of collective rights,12 
whereby groups seek respect for their own religious ethos even, at times, against 
more general frameworks or individual aspirations and beliefs. Furthermore, the 
emphasis placed by the European Court of Human Rights on individual rights 
cannot hide the fact that the human rights discourse is in itself a framework and 
that the fusion of human rights and religion may not be unanimously accepted. 
Might the role of religion not be somewhat restricted if it were thought to exist 
only within the framework laid down by human rights instruments? Depending on 
one’s point of view, might one not fear or welcome a dilution of religion which 
would no longer be protected for itself but as a human right amongst others?13
Alternatively, the human rights discourse may itself be seen as a form of 
religion or theology. Thus, as Edge (2001) puts it, ‘rather than international law 
being seen as a qualitatively different mode of thought which can be used to 
evaluate religious systems, it may be more accurate to see the interaction between 
international law and religious systems as a unique form of interfaith dialogue.’ 
Ruston (2004: 270) goes so far as to suggest that the concept of human rights 
can be traced, at least in part, to an imago Dei theology that goes back at least 
10 See for a criticism of the method in family law, Bradley 2004.
11 On the margin of appreciation, see Sweeney 2005.
12 On the notion of collective rights, Rivers 2001.
13 Evans 2000.
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as far as Augustine of Hippo and which, he suggests, ‘… owes little to secular 
Enlightenment sources and everything to an enduring religious tradition shared by 
both Catholics and Protestants, even though not consistently practised by them’.
Within the human rights framework itself, the consecration of religion as a 
human right was questioned by some as an unnecessary step: for instance, would 
freedom of religion not already fall under the ambit of other human rights such as 
freedom of expression or privacy?14 Despite these controversies and the general 
decline in religious practice – as opposed to religious beliefs (Davie 2002: 5) – 
it seems that the emergence of religious freedoms in a human rights framework 
has contributed to the growing importance of religious issues in the legal sphere 
across Europe. The question is no longer whether or not we should have religious 
freedoms but, rather, how we are to accommodate them. That said, however, in 
meeting these new challenges as to the ‘how’, previous controversies about the 
‘why’ – the purpose and role of religion within legal frameworks – inevitably 
resurface. In addition to possible tensions generated by the relationships between 
‘religious’ and ‘legal’ frameworks and by the different possible levels of perspective 
– individual, national, infranational or supranational – the concept of religious 
freedoms itself is often at the source of misunderstandings and potential conflicts.
The freedom recognized for schoolchildren under the right to religious 
freedoms may therefore give rise to different interpretations. In France, for 
example,15 religious freedom may seem to blur the distinction which is drawn in a 
school context between freedom of conscience and freedom of thought:
Freedom of conscience along with its constituents freedom of religion and 
freedom of belief guarantees diversity of belief in society and the freedom to 
express those beliefs. Freedom of thought ensures the right to independently 
reexamine beliefs received from family, social groups and society as a whole. 
This way a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them or turn away 
from them to something else. Naturally, this is a conceptual distinction and 
clearly daily life produces constant disharmony between these two freedoms. 
But the perspective is not the same and the French view school as the perfect 
institution to teach future citizens to exploit their faculties of reason and to help 
them exercise freedom of thought.16
Behind those conceptual subtleties lie fundamental questions about the meaning of 
individual freedom of thought and conscience. In the name of individual freedom 
and in compliance with the distinction drawn above, the French have banned the 
ostentatious display of all religious symbols in state schools:17 a move than most 
14 Nickel 2005.
15 For an illuminating analysis on the French position, see McGoldrick 2006: chapter 2.
16 Baubérot 2003: 461.
17 Loi no. 2004–228 of 15 March 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de 
laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieusedans les 
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other Western countries would construe as an attempt at state indoctrination and 
the very opposite to freedom of thought and conscience.
If the meaning of the autonomy granted under the right to religious freedom 
is thus unclear, so is the holder of that right: are we acknowledging children’s 
religious freedoms or parental beliefs? under article 9 of the ECHR children are 
entitled to freedom of religion; but parents are also entitled to have their children 
educated according to their own beliefs under article 2 of Protocol 1.18 In practice, 
children’s rights tend to be merged into those of their parents.19 This is slightly 
at odds with other areas where the entitlement of children as right bearers has 
been more willingly recognized.20 Would it be realistic completely to separate the 
child’s and the parents’ perspectives? To attempt to ascertain whether a child’s 
claim that his or her religious freedom had been infringed was truly motivated by 
the child’s individual beliefs or by family opinion or pressure would be riddled 
with difficulties. Could a judge realistically embark on a systematic questioning 
of the reasons underlying a given religious commitment? Would the coincidence 
between family tradition and religious adherence strengthen the religious 
commitment or would it weaken it on the grounds that – allegedly – it had been 
embraced not by the child as an individual but as part of the family? The French 
position could be seen as protecting children’s autonomy against possible parental 
and social pressure whereas the English approach could be seen as favouring 
family choices.21
More uncertain still are the meanings of ‘religious’ and ‘religion’ under the 
right to religious freedoms and right to freedom of religion. Are we referring 
to the way that individuals perceive their beliefs or to the way that religious 
communities define themselves and their members? Indirectly, albeit based on 
écoles, colleges, lycées publics, JO 17 March 2004, 5190 (Act regulating, by virtue of 
the principle of ‘laïcité’, the wearing of religious symbols or clothing in state primary and 
secondary schools).
18 Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR reads as follows: ‘No person shall be denied 
the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’
19 ECtHR Valsamis v. Greece (1996) 24 EHRR 294, Kilkelly 1999.
20 See in England and Wales, the Gillick case, Gillick v. Western Norfolk and Wisbech 
AHA [1986] AC 112 and the Children Act 1989 and, in the context of the united Nations, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Those landmark texts and decision 
mark a shift in the thinking about children. The idea that children have the capacity and 
more fundamentally the right to make decisions for themselves began to emerge. See for 
a reflection of the theoretical underpinnings of children’s rights and a case in favour of 
children’s rights, MDA Freeman: 1983 and 1997: chapters 1, 2 and 4. 
21 R (on the application of Begum) v. Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School [2007] AC 100 where Baroness Hale was the only member of the House of Lords 
to appreciate that the 14-year-old girl concerned might have a different opinion from her 
parents on dress. See Freeman 2010: 7.
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racial discrimination, the decision of the uK Supreme Court in the JFS case22 may 
be read as a victory for the individual perspective of religion over its collective 
dimension. in that case, a Jewish faith school had refused to admit a candidate on the 
ground that he was not halachically Jewish. Whatever the degree of the applicant’s 
self-identification as Jewish and his involvement in the Jewish community, he 
was not regarded as Jewish because his mother’s conversion to Judaism was 
not recognized as valid by the Office of the Chief Rabbi and, as a result, he did 
not meet the school’s admission criteria. Although the uK Supreme Court did 
not directly arbitrate the conflict between these two conceptions of Jewishness 
but, strictly speaking, only ruled on the scope of the Race Relation Act 1976, the 
outcome gives precedence to the individual dimension. The race discrimination 
angle lent support to a more generous approach of Jewishness. As Cranmer (2010: 
82) puts it ‘if a child of Jewish parents (even if its mother, in the eyes of some 
Jews, has been improperly converted) practices Judaism as he or she understands 
it and self-identifies as Jewish, it is difficult to see how a claim by the child to 
be ethnically-Jewish can be lightly set aside – whatever the view the religious 
authorities may take about his or her Jewishness’. By rejecting the school’s policy 
as constituting discrimination based on ethnicity, the Court indirectly gives weight 
to how individuals define their religious affiliation.23 This is all the more striking 
given that, for the Orthodox Jewish faith, individual conscious affiliation is not a 
defining feature of Jewishness (McCrudden 2011).
The recognition of ‘religious’ freedoms also raises questions for the protection 
of non-religious believers. Does the recognition of ‘religious’ freedoms imply that 
one must always give a voice to religion? Can we ever have a true recognition of 
religion in French schools if all ‘ostentatious’ religious signs have to be left outside 
school premises and faith has to pass the impossible test of rationality? Or is this 
complete blank space the very condition of religious recognition in a laïc State? 
How much attention should be given to minority religious opinions? Can we ever 
have recognition of minority religion in the united Kingdom if mainstream views 
are implicitly given precedence? Or is priority to mainstream views a necessary 
condition for harmonious religious coexistence in a multicultural society? Can we 
respect individual religious freedom fully without losing sight of the meaning of 
22 R (on the application of E) v. The Governing Body of JFS and the Admissions 
Appeal Panel of JFS and others [2009] uKSC 15.
23 This subjective approach was also adopted in the case of Williamson, R v. Secretary 
of State for Education and Employment and Ors ex parte Williamson and Ors [2005] 
uKHL 15, paras 22 and 23 where Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead declared: ‘[I]t is not for 
the court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its “validity” by some 
objective standard such as the source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or 
the orthodox teaching of the religion in question or the extent to which the claimant’s belief 
conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same religion. Freedom of 
religion protects the subjective belief of an individual.’
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‘religious’ and giving way to all sorts of personal whims?24 can we adequately 
guarantee freedom from religion in States where the majority is overwhelmingly 
religious? If the adjective ‘religious’ in religious freedoms is to include non-
religious beliefs as explicitly prescribed by the European Court of Human Rights 
and not to be limited to beliefs held by the majority, how are we to define what 
beliefs are to be protected, what balance is to be reached between conflicting 
beliefs and, to go back to our starting point, what equilibrium is to be struck 
between individual belief (and identity) and national values (and identity)? These 
tensions and fundamental questions arise in other contexts such as the workplace 
(Vickers 2008) but are particularly acute in the sphere of education.
Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe
For a variety of reasons, the problems linked to the accommodation of religious 
freedoms in Western Europe are more sensitive in the sphere of education than 
in other fields such as the workplace. Whereas the workplace engages adults, 
the activity of education is mainly addressed to children who are possibly more 
vulnerable to proselytism than are workers.25 Schooling is vital – and compulsory – 
for children. It is the place ‘where they learn about the world, about the place they 
will occupy in it, about powers and inequality’.26 If it is true that the workplace 
contributes to the common good as a factor for harmonious social relations and 
economic prosperity, the influence of education on individuals’ minds and a 
nation’s mentality are even more profound. State schools are both the bedrock 
of a nation’s values and the means by which it helps to form good citizens. In 
secular States such as France, schools are entrusted with the important mission 
of teaching the values of republicanism, individualism, equality and democracy.27 
But this national dimension of state school education is not unique to laïc states. 
Non-laïc States such as the united Kingdom and Germany also regard schools 
as vital places for the building of a cohesive society28 and for the transmission 
of the nation’s cultural heritage – including its religious traditions.29 generally 
speaking, ‘education is the first building block to promote a genuinely plural and 
tolerant society’ (Zucca Chapter 1). Education, moreover, clearly belongs to the 
public sphere which includes the state education system. State schools represent 
24 See however ECtHR X, Y and Z v. UK (1982) 31 D&R 50, stating that only beliefs 
with some cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance could fall within the ambit of 
article 9 of the European Convention.
25 ECtHR Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application no. 42393/93; Asmi v. Kirklees 
Metropolitan Council [2007] ICR 1154.
26 Freeman 2010: 6.
27 Corbett 1996.
28 The Education and Inspections Act 2006 imposes a duty on governors of state 
schools in England to promote community cohesion in their conduct of their school (s.38).
29 Haüßler 2001: 465.
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emblematically the chosen national model of Church/State relationships – and 
that model is often the result of historical conflicts in which schools were the 
battleground. Consequently, any challenge to a given legal solution aimed at 
accommodating religious freedoms in school is often perceived as a direct threat 
to a nation’s identity.
This collection will explore the challenges posed by religious freedoms in 
the sphere of education in Western Europe. The role of this introduction is first 
and foremost to present the main questions that have arisen before setting out 
the approaches adopted by the contributors. The question as to whether or not 
religious plurality is being accommodated within schools – or indeed whether 
or not it should be so accommodated – is widely debated in Western Europe and 
a number of perspectives and tensions may be identified: between national and 
religious identities; between separatist and cooperationist approaches between 
State and religion; between the public and private spheres; between integration, 
assimilation, segregation and equality.
The Themes of the Book
National and Religious Identities
Recognition of religious freedoms as a human right is justified because of the 
importance of religious beliefs for an individual’s self-perception and self-
construction. Religious beliefs ‘define a person’s very being – his sense of who he 
is, why he exists, and how he should relate to the world around him. A person’s 
religious beliefs cannot meaningfully be separated from the person himself: they 
are who he is.’30 National identities, proclaimed and protected through national 
constitutions or constitutional arrangements and conventions, are valued as a 
cement for cohesive societies.31 Both national and individual religious identities 
generally mingle and the historical, political and legal background of a given 
country will certainly influence the way in which it individual citizens express and 
perceive their religious identity. But there will not always be harmony between the 
manifestations of national and religious individual identities, leaving conflicts to 
be arbitrated under a supranational human rights framework. Religious identities 
may also be national, with the State establishing one particular church as a national 
church. More complex still, the State may recognize a variety of national churches, 
as is the case in the united Kingdom with the Church of England, the Church 
of Wales and the Church of Scotland (see Sandberg and Buchanan Chapter 5) 
30 Conkle 1988: 1164–5.
31 See for example the debates on Britishness in the House of Lords, HL Deb, 19 June 
2008, c. 1140–c. 1172 and the Library notes for debates [Online] available at htpp://www.
parliament.uk/documents/lords-library/lln2008–015.pdf. [Accessed: 14 March 2011].
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or a variety of federal entities.32 There are further subtleties in the relationships 
between State and Church in those countries that have official churches. National 
churches need not always be ‘established by law’ and can have a high degree of 
autonomy, as is the case in great Britain.33 Moreover, religious identities within a 
single State can themselves become an element in different national allegiances – 
as in Northern Ireland where ‘“Catholics” (…) describe the community that tends 
to Irish nationalism, and a greater identity with Ireland, whereas “Protestants” tend 
to unionism, and a greater identity with Great Britain’ (McCrudden Chapter 6). 
Finally, beyond individual and state religious identities, groups and institutions may 
also seek to have their own religious identities and ethos recognized and protected. 
All of those different levels of identities are to be found in the school context.
Group religious identities: religious schools
One way of promoting religious identity in the education sector has been to 
encourage the emergence of schools which seek to enforce a religious ethos.
In the united Kingdom, ‘faith schools’ are a common feature of the state 
school system. But not all of them actually promote a strong religious ethos nor 
are they afforded the level of autonomy that one might suspect: only ‘voluntary 
aided schools with a religious character’ are granted a relatively high degree of 
autonomy, whereas foundation or voluntary controlled schools with a religious 
character mostly have to abide by the rules applicable to schools without a religious 
character (Sandberg and Buchanan Chapter 5). And the divide between these 
categories does not necessarily reflect a higher or lesser degree of religiosity in the 
schools in question, with the result that the recognition of a religious character of 
a given school tells us little about the legal framework applicable to that school or 
the strength of its religious ethos. Similarly, the general observation that French 
religious schools (which are necessarily private) lack a strong religious ethos is 
undeniably true of Catholic schools which represent 98 per cent of the private 
schools in France (Chélini-Pont Chapter 7) but can hide contrary minority trends. 
Thus, even if French private religious schools under state contract are to be very 
inclusive, one may detect a revival of religious identity in Jewish schools: ‘the 
Jewish sector differs from the general private one by its strong religious character’ 
albeit with a few Jewish schools opposing to this trend of religious radicalization 
a ‘cultural-secular’ option (Cohen Chapter 2).
32 In Germany, the organization of schools thus falls under the competence of German 
states (Länder): Basic Law Art 70 (Lock Chapter 17). In Switzerland, the regulation of the 
relationship between the Church and the State is the responsibility of the Cantons: Federal 
Constitution Art 72.
33 under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919; the Welsh Church 
Act 1914 and the Church of Scotland Act 1921. Strictly speaking, the latter did not 
confer independence on the Church of Scotland but only recognized its inherent existing 
independence. See Cross and Livingstone 1997. I am grateful to Frank Cranmer for pointing 
this out to me in an earlier draft.
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Beyond the complexities of the religious ethos of schools and individual 
beliefs, States may themselves, as mentioned above, claim a religious identity, 
either explicitly through an established or official Church or, more implicitly, 
through the endorsement of religious practices and symbols which have become 
part of a nation’s culture and history.
State religious identities and individual freedom from religion
How can a State claim its own religious identity and yet remain neutral and 
respectful towards all religious beliefs? The question was indirectly raised in the 
Lautsi case where Italy, albeit a secular State claiming no religious identity, allowed 
its Catholic heritage to be displayed in the form of crucifix in the classroom. The 
ECtHR first held in a chamber judgment that the presence of a crucifix in state 
classrooms was incompatible with pupils’ freedom not to be subjected to religion,34 
before ruling on appeal, in Grand Chamber,35 that the relevant Italian ‘authorities 
(had) acted within the limits of the margin of appreciation left to the respondent 
State’ (para. 76). The Grand Chamber did not deny the religious connotation of the 
crucifix nor the preponderant visibility it gave to Christianity (para. 71) but given 
the essentially passive nature of the symbol (para. 72) and the overall openness of 
Italian state schools towards all religions (para. 74), it considered that the decision 
to display crucifix was within the margin of appreciation granted to Member States. 
The same question was raised in Germany before the Federal Constitutional Court 
in 1995.36 Having established that the cross was a religious symbol, the German 
Constitutional Court held that its presence in state schools amounted to a direct 
interference by the State with pupils’ freedom from religion or from Christian 
religion. The main rationale for the German Constitutional Court’s decision was 
the inescapability of the cross: school pupils were thus forced to study under the 
cross (Lock Chapter 17).
Laïc States and individual freedom of religion
In States such as France where national religious identity is hardly acknowledged, 
the thorny recurring issue will be whether or not the importance of religion for 
individuals (and groups) can nevertheless be sufficiently recognized and preserved. 
In France, citizens are defined in their common humanity and equality before the 
law (Zucca Chapter 1). Any differences in terms of gender, race, position, status 
or religion should be irrelevant before the law. Similarly, any membership of 
minority groups and any claims for minority rights will be discarded as threatening 
the equality accorded to individuals. There is a fear that minority rights would 
serve groups rather than individual members and, at a conceptual level, French 
34 ECtHR Lautsi v. Italy 3 November 2009, Application no. 30814/06.
35 ECtHR Grand Chamber Lautsi v. Italy 18 March 2011, Application no. 30814/06.
36 BverfGE 93,1. 
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identity will therefore ignore its underlying religious identities.37 There is debate 
as to whether laïcité, at least in some of its most militant versions, operates as a 
hindrance to the integration of immigrants,38 especially those of Muslim origins. 
One may at least wonder whether the abstract construction which derives from 
the concept of laïcité in France does not conveniently hide the difficulties that 
the population of Muslim origin often faces in fact. At school, might not the ban 
on all ostentatious religious symbols run the risk of erecting national secular and 
individual religious identities as conflicting entities, confronting individuals with 
impossible choices? Most probably it will; but empirical research would be needed 
to confirm that this is indeed the outcome of the law and to rebut the evidence that 
many pupils in French state schools actually welcome the opportunity given to 
them by the ban to escape other impossible choices between preferences expressed 
by their families, friends and society as a whole.39 Beyond those controversies, the 
desire which lies at the very heart of the concepts of laïcité and formal equality 
to have a common destiny and to erase the inequalities which religion and social 
memberships may trigger should certainly not be scorned. Valuing diversity 
(which is the option favoured in the uK) is no certain guarantee of a peaceful 
and cohesive coexistence because it is always possible that socio-cultural and 
economic gaps between groups will make mutual increasingly impossible (Zucca 
Chapter 1). Moreover, one should be careful not to caricature national positions 
and exaggerate differences between them. The concept of laïcité for example is 
but one way of accommodating religious plurality and should not be seen as the 
negation of religion.40
Whatever the ‘model’, the consequences that it carries in the sector of 
education are unclear. Does the goal of a common destiny prescribe a national 
uniform syllabus, devoid of any religious content? Conversely, what does the 
recognition of ‘diversity’ mean at school? Can any type of symbol be allowed and 
any derogation from the national syllabus authorized, so long as they are inspired 
by religious motivations?
Separatist or Cooperationist Models
Laïcité and rationality
Macklem (2000) argues that it is the fact that religious views are based on faith 
rather than reason that gives rise to the need to protect them. This argument would 
be particularly problematic in France in a school context, where rationality is 
unquestionably given priority. Laïcité, historically linked to the revolutionary 
37 This is at the antipode of the notion of consciational democracy, a political system 
where entitlements and responsibilities are given to (religious) communities rather than to 
individuals, as in Northern Ireland (McCrudden Chapter 6).
38 Freedman 2004.
39 Sage 2005.
40 I am grateful to Prof. Martine Cohen for underlining this point.
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ideas of ‘l’Esprit des Lumières’ does not only summarize the ways in which 
France has chosen to deal with Church/State relationships, it also expresses a 
positive belief41 with its own teaching and its own places of worship: town halls, 
official state buildings and state schools).42 This positive dimension of laïcité 
distinguishes it from notions of secularism and mere neutrality which only seek to 
maintain a neutral position and minimize state interference into religious beliefs. 
The presentation of laïcité as an opinion may, however, be misleading because it 
may suggest that laïcité could have its own subject in the shape, for example, of a 
civic education class alongside religious education classes. But laïcité as an ideal 
goes much further. It implies the possibility of escaping all mention of religion 
as a social grounding, of avoiding the necessity to position oneself as a believer 
or non-believer and of thinking outside all reference to religion.43 Following 
that logic, religion should not be taught in laïc state schools at all. Freedom of 
religion is taken into account in France insofar as pupils are granted one afternoon 
a week off school in order to attend religious instruction outside school premises 
should they wish to do so (Van den Kerchove Chapter 12). Moreover, French state 
secondary schools may allow the presence of chaplaincy on school premises if 
parents request it44 (Chélini-Pont Chapter 7).
This is, however, but one (rigid) form of laïcité.45 A more open version of the 
concept, whilst still advocating some separation between State and religion, could 
accommodate individual manifestations of religious beliefs at schools, either 
through clothing or chosen teaching of Religious Education. The accommodation 
of religious symbols worn by pupils and the organization of religious education 
classes does not necessarily entail State/Church cooperation. In that sense, neither 
necessarily conflict with the requirements of laïcité per se, as indeed illustrated 
by Italy, where the laïque nature of the Republic46 is no obstacle to the presence 
of religious symbols and classes in Italian state schools or by earlier case law of 
the French Conseil d’Etat.47 even under the most radical forms of laïcité there is 
at least a tenable argument for teaching about religion where not to do so would 
deprive pupils of the tools and general cultural background that are needed for 
a sound understanding of social events, history and art. From that intellectual 
perspective, a revival of religion can be detected in French laïc schools (Van den 
41 Ronan 1991.Against this conception of laïcité as an opinion or belief in itself, 
Caye and Terré 2005: 34.
42 Cf. suggesting to establish a bank holiday dedicated to ‘Laïcité’ on 9 December, 
date of the 1905 Act on the separation of Church and State, Philippe Vitel MP from the party 
uMP (Var), Question to the Prime Minister no. 68744, JO 19 January 2010, 443.
43 Kintzler 2005: 54.
44 Art R 141–2 and R 141–4 of the Code of Education.
45 For the variations in the concept of laïcité, see Bouchard-Taylor 2008: chapter 7, 
131–153; Baubérot and Milot 2011.
46 Based on Art. 7 of the Italian Constitution, amongst other constitutional provisions.
47 CE 27 November 1989 Avis, RFDA 1990, 1, where religious symbols worn by 
students were not per se seen as conflicting with the requirements of an ‘open laïcité’.
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Kerchove Chapter 12; Debray 2002). To enter the perimeter of French laïc state 
schools, religion thus needs to wear the cloak of rationality; and rather than to be 
studied as a separate subject, as ‘religion’ it is to be examined within other core 
subjects as a ‘(religious) issue’ influencing history or art. This particular way of 
teaching about religion or, more accurately, about religious issues, is perceived as 
a guarantee of the objective presentation of religious matters. Indeed, teachers of 
French state schools, most of whom are civil servants, are not allowed to display 
their own beliefs; and if they were to discuss faith directly it would be seen as 
exposing them to too high a risk of subjectivity. The incorporation of religious 
issues into core subjects such as history or history of arts is, however, no reliable 
protection against subjectivity and biases. The content of history textbooks, for 
example, reveals a great imbalance in favour of Christianity. Other religions are 
largely ignored or only mentioned from the perspective of Christianity (Van den 
Kerchove Chapter 12). But even so, these trends represent a new perspective on 
religious issues in French state schools. In fact, one may detect a resurrection of 
religion in French schools.48
Interestingly, discussion of religion under the cloak of rationality echoes claims 
made in uS schools – but the goal of presenting religion in that way is the opposite 
one of that sought in France. unlike in France, the objective in the uS is not to 
foster a greater awareness of religion as a social issue – a dimension that hardly 
anyone would contest in the uS – but to present religious beliefs, and in particular 
beliefs about the creation of the world, as scientific theories (Barendt Chapter 13). 
Beyond the question of how one should discuss religion in the classroom, these 
claims of rationality question what religion actually is. The uS Supreme Court 
offers interesting lessons for Europe. One of the key factors put forward by the 
Supreme Court is the educational purpose (or lack of purpose) of the proposed 
measure (Barendt Chapter 13). For example, according to the uS constitutional 
case law, the proposed introduction of the Book of Genesis in a biology class 
would not fulfil such a purpose because its aim is not to broaden pupils’ minds and 
deepen their knowledge (an objective which could be claimed for the introduction 
of the Book of Genesis in religious education classes) but to promote religious 
views of the world by presenting them in competition with or in lieu of other 
accounts of the beginning of the Earth and humankind. Conversely, purely for 
educational purposes the teaching in history classes about religion in France could 
arguably be enhanced and improved without necessarily putting into jeopardy the 
French model of laïcité. By contrast to France, in most European States, religion 
will be the object of a separate subject at school.
48 See evidence of this renewal in the research and publications undertaken and 
gathered by the IESR (Institut Européen en Science des Religions), [Online] available at: 
http://www.iesr.ephe.sorbonne.fr/ [Accessed: 30 March 2011].
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Neutrality through opt-outs
Religious education/instruction is in most European States a traditional part of 
the national school syllabus and debates surrounding religion do not focus on 
whether religion or not should be present in the syllabus or where it should feature 
but on how religious education/instruction classes should be taught in order 
to accommodate all beliefs. Respect for freedom of religion and freedom from 
religion is generally guaranteed by the optional nature of the course.49 However, 
this general model has not been enforced without controversy and is regularly 
challenged as being insufficiently neutral and inclusive for our multicultural 
societies. The most acute debates have concerned the right of non-believers not to 
be subjected to religious instruction.50
In the uK, the pervasiveness of religion is reflected in the provisions relating 
to religious worship. All schools in England and Wales, whether of a religious 
character or not, must hold a daily act of worship.51 Moreover, the presence of 
religion raises the question of which religion should be present. England and 
Wales prescribe a broadly Christian character both for the act of daily worship52 
and for the content of religious education classes.53 Respect for minority beliefs 
is to be guaranteed mainly by the right to opt out. However, the efficacy of the 
opt-out system on the ground has been questioned, not least because little is 
done actually to inform pupils of its existence (Mawhinney et al. Chapter 11). 
Moreover, does not the premise of freedom of choice on which the opt-out 
system is based underplay the risk of peer pressure on pupils and their parents 
to conform to the norm (Cumper Chapter 10)? Finally, how much of a choice do 
parents have if little is offered in the way of a worthwhile alternative to those who 
choose to opt out (Cumper Chapter 10)? Should civic education be offered as an 
alternative? But would such a non-religious course be compatible with the duty of 
neutrality of the State towards religion? Could the introduction of such a course 
be suspected of promoting a kind of ‘state religion’? Many in Spain have argued 
that such a course, if compulsory, would affect children’s and parents’ right to 
freedom of religion even if a course on religious education were to be offered in 
parallel. Alternatively, could students who chose to follow religious instruction/
education classes not legitimately complain that in doing so they were deprived 
of the possibility also to follow the course on civic education, as if one could not 
be both a citizen and a believer (García Oliva Chapter 9)? Would the way forward 
therefore be to change the content of religious education classes so as to make it 
more inclusive and therefore acceptable to all?
49 See for example in England and Wales, School Standards and Framework Act 
1998, s.71.
50 See ECtHR Grzelak v. Poland, Application no. 7710/02, 15 June 2010 (Cumper 
Chapter 10).
51 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s.70.
52 Schedule 20 to School Standards and Framework Act 1998.
53 School Standards and Framework Act 1998 and Education Act 1996, s.375(3).
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Neutrality through inclusiveness in religious education
It is difficult to design a religious education syllabus which would be inclusive 
enough to justify the mandatory nature of the course.54 The shift from religious 
instruction to religious education classes in many countries is already a step in 
the direction of inclusiveness (Cumper Chapter 10). In England and Wales, for 
example, legislation stresses that ‘religious education is the study of religion rather 
than the study in religion’ (Sandberg and Buchanan Chapter 5). But is there not 
a risk that in opening up the scope of religious education one may fail to convey 
the ‘heritage of the nation’55 or dilute the religious component of a course56 which 
many still see as an integral part of religious education classes?
It may be preferable for a teacher of history of religions to be atheist, or at least 
agnostic, rather than a believer. He or she will be more objective. However, 
a teacher appointed by the church in order to transmit its teachings and its 
mysteries of faith should logically be a believer and become an example or 
a model for his pupils with his own life. If this is not required, I understand 
nothing …57
Must the religious or secular tradition of a given State be abandoned for the sake 
of inclusiveness? What, in other words, are the relationships that the public and 
private spheres should enjoy in this context?
Public and Private Spheres
Teachers v. students
The traditional French approach tends to assign religious practices to the private 
sphere58 and, in an educational context, to private schools. But most of those private 
(and possibly religious) institutions are in fact closely monitored and supported by 
the State, in compliance with the framework set out in the Loi Debré 1959. French 
private Catholic schools are highly integrated into public education: ‘the choice is 
54 EctHR 29 June 2007 Folgerø and others v. Norway, Application no. 15472/02, 
condemning Norway for introducing a mandatory course on Christian Knowledge and 
Religious and Ethical Education whose content was judged to be insufficiently critical, 
objective and pluralistic (Zucca Chapter 1).
55 Which is the justification for the broadly Christian character of religious worship 
and religious education in England and Wales.
56 A denominational religious education course will however be taught in England 
and wales in voluntary aided schools, known as faith schools, in accordance with the 
tenets of the religion or religious denomination specified in relation to the school (School 
Standards and Framework Act 1998, Schedule 19 para. 4) but parents can ask for their 
children to opt out and receive instead the non-denominational course provided in other 
schools (Sandberg and Buchanan Chapter 5).
57 Bejarano 2001, quoted by García Oliva: Chapter 9. 
58 Laborde 2005: 318, more generally, Trigg 2007.
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one of massive presence rather than a reduced denominational presence’ (Chélini-
Pont Chapter 7). As a result, both students and teachers attending or working in 
Catholic schools will also be part of the public system and as such will be allowed 
to refuse to take part in events displaying the school’s religious ethos. In practice, 
therefore, the distinctive religious character of Catholic schools will constantly be 
challenged59 despite the classification of those schools as being on the private side 
of the divide. The result is that the divide between the public and private spheres 
does not coincide perfectly with the divide between public and private schools.
Private schools can be heavily involved in the public sphere and be restricted by 
public duties, as the French example shows. Conversely, in States attached to the 
concept of neutral cooperation rather than of laïcité such as Germany, the public 
duty to remain religiously neutral will only concern teachers who owe the State a 
duty of loyalty60 and its extension to pupils will be more problematic (Lock Chapter 
17). Nor will the duty of loyalty owed by teachers equate to the duty of neutrality 
of the State itself towards religion. If the two duties were assimilated, teachers 
would lose their own fundamental rights to religious freedom: a dimension whose 
importance was underlined by the German Constitutional Court in the Ludin case61 
(Lock Chapter 17). At the other end of the spectrum, teachers in Northern Ireland 
will be trained either in Catholic or in Protestant teacher training colleges and 
will then teach either in Catholic or Protestant schools (McCrudden Chapter 6); 
the concept of a public sphere that transcends religious allegiances is simply non-
existent in the non-secular and bipolarized Northern Irish system. In England and 
Wales more complex categories will apply, with the public/private law divide 
being completely blurred by finer distinctions between different types of schools: 
foundation schools, academies, voluntary aided schools, controlled schools and, 
more recently, free schools. Many of these will have a religious character despite 
being largely funded by the State (Vickers Chapter 4).
A relative and problematic divide
Overall, the division between the public and the private spheres never appears 
to be absolute62 even in secular States such as France where a strict separation 
between the State and religion is proclaimed. The very principle of a divide 
between public (non-religious) and private (possibly religious) spheres may, 
generally speaking, appear too crude63 and does not sit well with many systems 
of religious belief. The law may forbid the wearing of the Islamic veil in public 
spaces, precisely where an observant Muslim woman will feel that wearing it is 
59 Cf. Chélini-Pont: Chapter 7, pointing to the SuNDEP (teachers’ unions) fighting 
against the involvement of teachers in any assemblies and events relating to the distinctive 
religious character of Catholic schools.
60 Article 33(5) of the Basic Law.
61 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2 C 21.01 (4 July 2002).
62 Oliver 1999.
63 Habermas 1991.
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a religious requirement, and allow it in the private sphere, where the religious 
need to protect women’s modesty64 does not arise. From the point of view of 
religious institutions, the crucial challenge will be to reconcile State requirements 
flowing from the participation of religious institutions in public services with the 
preservation of their own religious ethos. Cooperation with or absorption into the 
state system does not entail giving up the religious ethos which characterizes a 
particular school: private schools under state contracts in France, for example, 
will have their ‘specific character’ recognized under the Loi Debré, while any 
foundation or voluntary school in England and Wales may be designated by the 
Secretary of State as having a religious character where he is satisfied that the 
school was established by a religious body or for religious purposes65 (Sandberg 
and Buchanan Chapter 5). But this participation in the public sector may carry with 
it special duties such as, in England and Wales,66 the duty to promote community 
cohesion67 and, more recently,68 the duty to promote equality (Vickers Chapter 4).
In most jurisdictions,69 state involvement will preclude religious schools from 
implementing their religious ethos in a discriminatory way: tolerance towards 
other believers and non-believers will have to be secured even where this might 
undermine the core beliefs of the religion to which the school adheres. So is 
individual religious freedom being enforced at the cost of groups’ and schools’ 
religious ethos or is the dilution of religiosity in religious schools a consequence 
of the secularization of society as a whole (Cohen Chapter 2) rather than an effect 
of a human rights or discrimination law discourse? The exact equilibrium to be 
reached between the regard to be granted to a school’s ethos and the respect to be 
given to individual freedom of religion may vary within the state school system 
itself, depending on the type of school concerned. In England and Wales, voluntary 
controlled and foundation schools and voluntary aided schools with a religious 
character are allowed to discriminate in the appointment and management of their 
staff and the latter schools to a greater extent than the former. yet the distinction 
between voluntary controlled and voluntary aided schools relates to questions of 
funding and governance and may not be necessarily be significant in terms of the 
religious ethos of the school (Vickers Chapter 4, Sandberg Chapter 16). So should 
the distinction really carry any weight when deciding the extent to which schools 
may be allowed to discriminate against their staff on grounds of religion?
More generally, the tension between a group religious ethos and individual 
religious freedoms feeds into wider debates on integration. How can we reconcile 
64 Surah XXIV, verse 31.
65 School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s.69(3).
66 More generally, see Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
(ASLEF) v. United Kingdom (2007) 45 EHRR 793.
67 Education and Inspections Act 2006, s.38.
68 under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (in force since April 2011).
69 There is no legal prohibition of religious discrimination in schools admissions in 
Northern Ireland and state schools in Northern Ireland are almost exclusively Protestant. 
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integration into the nation as a whole with integration within given (religious) 
communities?
Integration, Assimilation, Segregation and Equality
In Western European countries, ‘Integration is foremost a value per se, insofar 
as it rests on the fundamentally democratic notion that, in spite of divergence of 
their beliefs and their experience and their allegiances, people who have respect 
for what is right and in particular for human rights can live in harmony.’70 all 
Western European countries in search of harmonious social cohesion therefore 
have to ensure that the recognition of difference (in the name of the diversity of 
religious beliefs) does not erect an impossible hurdle in the way of more global 
thinking where believers (of all creeds) and non-believers alike can be seen as 
united. The concept of religious freedom offers the key to reconciling diversity 
within unity and unity within diversity. even if each and every one of us is the 
bearer of an individual right to freedom of religion and even if the contours of that 
right essentially rely on the bearer’s own evaluation of his or her beliefs71 – thus 
leading to a myriad of potential interpretations of what areas religious freedoms 
may cover – unity is nevertheless provided by the overall human rights framework.
However helpful it may be, the concept of religious freedoms tells us little 
about how to accommodate the religious freedoms of groups versus the religious 
freedoms of individuals (and vice versa). How inclusive do religious schools 
therefore need to be in order to respect individual rights to freedom of religion? 
National responses vary.
Integration and autonomy of religious schools
The autonomy granted to religious groups is more limited in laïc states than it 
is in neutral States or States with an established or official religion. In France, 
religious schools under state contracts will not be allowed to invoke their specific 
religious character in order to derogate from the general syllabus nor may they 
impose discriminatory entry requirements on pupils or make religious teaching 
and practices at school mandatory (Cohen Chapter 2). Far from being ‘islands 
of exclusivity’,72 the majority of (Catholic) private religious schools in France 
welcome pupils from varied religious backgrounds who often switch back and 
forth between the state and the private school systems. This integration of private 
schools into the state educational system, however, only applies to schools that 
have opted for a partnership with the State (under a ‘state contract’). Even then, 
70 Schnapper 1994.
71 The State should not ascertain whether particular religious beliefs or the means to 
express such beliefs are legitimate, ECtHR Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Application no. 
30985/9634 (2002) EHRR 55.
72 Expression used by Esau 1993.
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the proximity between the state and private sector may vary in practice given the 
lack of effective control by state authorities of the implementation of the terms of 
this state contract. For example, despite being under state contract, French Jewish 
schools close to the Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox communities have refused 
admission to non-Jewish children, including children born to non-Jewish mothers 
who have not undergone a conversion regarded as valid under Orthodox religious 
law (Cohen Chapter 2). When the JFS (Jewish Free School) in England tried to do 
the same, the practice was held to be illegal.73 The uK Supreme Court considered 
that the requirement that candidates be Jewish by reason of descent from a Jewish 
mother – because it excluded children of non-Jewish mothers who had not been 
validly converted74 – amounted in effect to a discrimination on grounds of race 
and was therefore illegal. The JFS case illustrates that a practice which may not 
be clearly discriminatory on the ground of religion may well come under attack 
as constituting race discrimination. For different reasons, French courts would 
no doubt also hold such selective admission criteria to be illegal (as violating 
the duty of schools under state contract to open admission) were there to be a 
challenge in court. But in the absence of litigation, the practice prospers. The 
irony is thus that French private schools under state contract which are legally 
bound to a wide admission policy may in fact in some instances be more selective 
than English schools with a religious character which are lawfully allowed to 
restrict entry based on religion or belief provided that, principally, the school is 
oversubscribed.75 However, in the vast majority of cases, the religious ethos of the 
‘faith school’ will be far more present in English schools than in French private 
religious schools.76
More generally, faith schools in Britain have been at times accused of 
exacerbating social divides (on the issue see Jackson 2003). But these debates 
have to be put into a broader context:
the crucial issue is the quality of education provided by the State. If you only 
have a right to do something mediocre, then you may just as well waive it in 
order to have a better education provided by the private sector. Regrettably, the 
poor quality of state provided education entrenches class differences based upon 
economic means (Zucca Chapter 1).
73 See note 22 supra.
74 This ethnic test could be overcome by non-Jewish mothers converting to Judaism 
in a manner recognized by the Orthodox branch but this possibility only confirmed the 
ethnic discrimination in the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court. Such a conversion 
was indeed seen as a significant burden which was only applicable to those who were not 
born with the requisite ethnic origins.
75 Schools Admission Code for 2007, paras 2.41–3. See Sandberg and Buchanan: 
Chapter 5.
76 See Chélini-Pont Chapter 7.
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From that perspective, British faith schools, the vast majority of which belong to 
the state sector, may on the contrary be seen as alleviating class differences by 
providing high-quality education regardless of economic means.
Integration, parents’ autonomy and protection of children
Another frequent argument put forward in support of faith schools is parental 
autonomy. The creation of religious schools may to some extent be seen as a 
consecration of parental choices in education. For Catholics in Northern Ireland, 
the creation of separate Catholic schools represented a haven of self-determination 
(McCrudden Chapter 6). Within the context of multi-faith schools, rights to opt out 
of classes with a religious content are further manifestations of a certain deference 
to parental views in education. In most jurisdictions, freedom of choice is – at least 
formally77 – granted to parents. The same is, however, not usually true in respect of 
the main protagonists: young pupils.78 Invariably, their freedom of religion seems 
to be merged into the educational choices made for them by their parents. But 
what if a particular child wished to manifest his religious belief in a way that his 
parents disapproved of or vice versa, if parents wanted to impose their religious 
convictions against their children’s wishes? If children’s human rights are to be 
taken seriously and children’s right to religious freedoms given any substance, 
parental educational rights should not, logically, be allowed systematically to trump 
their children’s views and legal frameworks should give scope for the expression 
of such views. In England and Wales, pupils – whatever their age – cannot as 
of right withdraw themselves from religious education classes (Cumper Chapter 
10); curiously, the right of withdrawal granted to sixth-formers is limited to the 
obligation to attend acts of daily worship.79 in the Williamson case,80 the parents’ 
religious belief that corporal punishment was to be used on their children whilst 
at school was not seen as fundamental enough to justify trumping the statutory 
ban81 against corporal punishment imposed on all school teachers. Although 
one may suspect that the children concerned might not have been very fond of 
the form of punishment claimed by their parents, the issue was not examined as 
one of conflict between parental choices and children’s views.82 only Baroness 
Hale of Richmond described the case as being as much about the rights of the 
77 For the limits and constraints surrounding this choice, see page 21 supra.
78 The uN Convention on the Rights of the Child proclaims that children have a right 
to education (Art 28), freedom of expression (Art 13), thought, conscience and religion 
(Art 14). The Convention has been largely ratified but has not usually been incorporated 
into national laws nor has been made fully binding on national courts. The Children’s 
Rights Bill was moved to the House of Lords in an attempt to make the Convention part of 
English Law but was abandoned.
79 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, s.71A.
80 R v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment and Ors ex parte Williamson 
and Ors [2005] uKHL 15.
81 Education Act 1996, s.548.
82 On this, see Dwyer 1998, Narisetti 2009, Lees and Howarth 2009.
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child as the rights of parents: ‘this is, and always has been, a case about children, 
their rights and the rights of their parents and teachers. yet there has been no 
one here … to speak on behalf of the children. The battle has been fought on 
ground selected by the adults’.83 However, the interests of children in general to 
be protected against violence came into play under article 9(2) of the European 
Convention in order to assess whether the infringements made against the parents’ 
freedom of religion were justified. Nevertheless, the recognition of children’s 
rights as being part of the equation was no reason for dismissing their parents’ 
rights to religious freedoms. So long as parents genuinely and strongly believe that 
corporal punishment is a tenet of their faith, judges will be reluctant to question the 
religious nature of their belief and deny them protection under article 9 paragraph 
1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Cranmer Chapter 14). However, 
as reflected in this case, the broader scope of what may constitute a religious belief 
for the purposes of article 9 paragraph 1 does not necessarily mean that religious 
beliefs will be afforded greater protection in practice. Indeed, recognition of a 
particular belief as warranting protection leaves open the question as to whether 
or not its particular manifestation can legitimately be restricted under article 9 
paragraph 2. The outcome will therefore normally depend on the particular facts 
of each case, unless additional filters are introduced under paragraph 1. under the 
‘specific situation rule’, even if the practices in question are found to constitute a 
manifestation of religious belief, claims will fail under article 9 paragraph 1 where 
claimants have voluntarily accepted the restrictions on their exercise and other 
means are available for them to practise their beliefs without undue any hardship 
or inconvenience. Mark Hill (Chapter 15) analyses and criticizes the rather crude 
application of this rule by English judges:84 ‘it is somewhat regrettable that the 
courts have sought artificially to limit the universal application of such rights (to 
religious freedoms) rather than systematically developing an exposition of the 
qualifications to those rights.’
The Structure of and Contributions to the Book
This overall methodological tension between conceptual debates and in concreto 
analysis is reflected in the structure adopted for this book – which leads us from a 
study of key concepts (Part I) to an analysis of case studies (Parts III and IV) via 
an examination of national models (Part II).
In the first part of this collection, the tensions and interactions between the key 
concepts of integration, laïcité, identity and discrimination are approached from a 
theoretical (Zucca), sociological (Cohen for France and Jewish schools and Jamal 
and Panjwani for England and Muslim Schools) and legal (Vickers) perspective.
83 Williamson 2 FLR 374, 395.
84 For example see R (on the application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors 
of Denbigh High School [2006] uKHL 15, [2006] 2 WLR 719.
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Lorenzo Zucca studies the concepts of integration and accommodation in a 
school context and finally rejects both in order to propose his own model of the 
‘classroom as a tolerance lab’. under that model, inclusiveness and solidarity 
would reign, both in respect of the content of the syllabus – with the introduction 
of a compulsory course in civic and religious education in the broadest possible 
sense – and in respect of the school system itself – with an emphasis being placed 
on funding good quality, inclusive state schools rather than faith or private schools.
martine Cohen analyses the shift towards an increased religiosity in Jewish 
private schools in France as an attempt to stress Jewish identity in an increasingly 
secular society. However, she suggests that there need not be a binary opposition 
between a strong national secular identity and a strong (Jewish) religious minority. 
Pluralist religious schools, she concludes, could also emerge and may also be 
welcome, provided they are not limited to the better off and better educated 
families.
Arif Jamal and farid Panjwani focus on Muslim religious identities in a 
school context. They show that for different reasons, in both Muslim and Western 
countries the teaching of Muslim tenets has become an object of study alongside 
other subjects of the syllabus such as science and history: ‘the enchanted history 
and beliefs of religion became scrutinized and interpreted by the standards of 
disenchanted historical and empirical methods’. This objectification of religion in 
the classroom matches a similar tendency in the courtroom where judges – though 
often reluctantly – sometimes seek to define a religious tradition against so called 
objective criteria. Jamal and Panjwani argue that such an approach is flawed for 
two reasons. First, it violates the subjectivity of the experience of the believer, 
contrary to the subjective basis that should legally underpin the individual right 
to religious freedom. Secondly, it fails to reflect the diversity of meanings and 
traditions that exist amongst Muslims.
Lucy Vickers’ analysis of the relevant legal framework relating to religious 
discrimination in English schools reveals the conceptual and practical difficulties 
that the implementation of potentially contradictory texts and directions are likely 
to raise. Vickers’ focus is on teachers in faith schools. Vickers argues that the 
discrimination that is presently allowed in voluntary aided schools to affect all 
staff beyond those involved in the teaching of religious education and regardless 
of the actual degree of religious ethos observed by the particular school may not 
be compatible with the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78 under which 
exceptions must be proven to be legitimate and proportionate. She also wonders 
whether the recent extension, under the Equality Act 2010, of the public sector 
equality duty to religion and belief will improve matters. Given the uncertainties 
of what religious beliefs may be covered under the new duty and the ambiguities 
of what equality would entail in practice, the best way forward, she argues, would 
be for schools to view their new duty to promote equality as part of the well-
established duty to promote social cohesion.
These key concepts of integration, laïcité, identity and discrimination cannot 
be read and understood fully outside of the social, historical, political and 
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constitutional contexts of national systems which are the focus of the second part 
of this book.
National models reveal a broad range of options between the complex and 
overall broadly Christian model in England and Wales (Sandberg and Buchanan), 
the highly segregationist and bipolar – Catholic and Protestant – structure in 
Northern Ireland (McCrudden), the separationist and laïc French system (Chélini-
Pont) and the neutral secularity of Germany (de Wall) and Spain (García Oliva). 
All reveal that the interplay of religion and education is deeply embedded in 
historical and political national contexts.
Russell Sandberg and Anna Buchanan present and analyse (theoretically 
and empirically) the English and Welsh model. They reveal discrepancies between 
schools labelled as being without a religious character but yet subject to the 
obligation to organize a daily act of worship and schools officially recognized as 
having a religious character and yet lacking sufficient autonomy to uphold their 
religious ethos. Beyond these contradictions, fundamental questions are raised as 
to the role, reality and meanings of daily worship in school practice, as to the place 
of minority religions vis-à-vis Christianity, and as to the place of Welsh law on 
religion vis-à-vis united Kingdom statutes. The increasing powers of the Welsh 
Assembly could, they suggest, be an opportunity to develop a law on religion in 
schools more in tune with twenty-first century society.
Christopher mcCrudden’s analysis of religion and education patterns in 
Northern Ireland reveals the bicommunalism that underpins the Northern Irish 
model, described as a ‘highly segregated, denominational and non-secular 
education system’ – itself the product of a consciational approach to democracy 
involving the sharing of power between segments of society joined together by a 
common citizenship but divided by ethnicity, language, religion or other factors. 
Despite an unmet need for places in mixed-religion schools, the scope for change 
is, he suggests, still limited: the impact of legislation on discrimination remains 
restricted in scope and the political context highly relevant.
Blandine Chélini-Pont’s analysis of the French system reveals that the 
dichotomy between a laïc state school system devoid of all religious manifestations 
and a private and religious school system is not a fair characterization of the 
French model. Indeed, the dichotomy undermines the high degree of involvement 
of Catholic private schools in French public education. She suggests that this high 
numerical presence of Catholic schools in a secularized public education system 
has led to a secularization of the Catholic school system itself, both as regards its 
teachers and its pupils. The challenge that French Catholic schools now face, she 
concludes, is to maintain their openness and non-denominational nature without 
losing all of their distinctive religious character.
heinrich de Wall analyses the meaning and consequences for the school 
context of the German notion of state religious neutrality. unlike the French 
concept of laïcité, religious neutrality does not require the absence of religion 
in the public sphere but merely demands that the State abstain from showing a 
preference or dislike for a particular religion or for religion in general. De Wall 
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examines the consequences of the concept in respect of religious instruction classes 
in German state schools. Provision of religious instruction in state schools complies 
with the concept of neutrality so long as it does not confer any advantageous or 
disadvantageous status on any particular religious group. Mindful of the need to 
respect state neutrality whilst at the same time respecting the rights of religious 
groups to self-determination, the German system has opted for a denominational 
form of religious instruction in which religious communities are highly involved. 
De Wall argues that this system is not only respectful of religious groups (which 
are thereby associated as crucial actors in the public sphere) but – thanks to a right 
to opt out granted to parents and, from the age of 14, to pupils themselves – is 
also respectful of parents’ and pupils’ rights to religious freedom. However, he 
concludes that the real challenge for the German model will come from the current 
demands of Muslim pupils and parents for Islamic religious instruction classes in 
state schools. it is only if those demands are accommodated and current institutional 
hurdles overcome (notably the lack of an umbrella Muslim organization able to 
speak out for German Muslims and decide on the issues surrounding religious 
instruction classes) that the German denominational model of religious instruction 
will have a future in a religiously pluralist German society.
Javier garcía oliva’s analysis of the Spanish model reveals that the 
cooperationist approach of Spain towards Church/State relationships hides a high 
involvement by church authorities in religion at school: religious education is 
denominational and teachers of religious instruction classes are proposed by the 
relevant church authorities. These features, García Oliva concedes, may be at times 
difficult to reconcile with the demands of equality: to what extent, for example, 
should Catholic Church authorities be allowed to dismiss or penalize teachers of 
Catholic religion whose conduct has been deemed not to be compatible with the 
tenets of the Catholic faith? Conversely, to what extent should the requirements 
of equality interfere with the right of churches to have their own identity and 
autonomy respected? So far as pupils are concerned, how can one ensure equality 
between pupils who study religious instruction and those who opt out and yet 
also ensure that religious instruction is treated like any of the other subjects in 
the school syllabus (as required under the agreement between Spain and the Holy 
See)? However delicate this conciliation may be, García Oliva concludes, the 
denominational nature of the course on religious instruction need not disappear 
and the involvement of church authorities be abolished. Denominational teaching 
of religion can be inclusive and involvement of church authorities, within limits, 
welcome and justified. On the whole, however, because of the controversial nature 
of denominational religious teaching and the problems related to finding a suitable 
alternative subject, the author expresses a preference for a compulsory subject of 
non-denominational religious education.
unsurprisingly, the oppositions revealed in Part I and Part II in the understandings 
of key concepts and national traditions amongst countries of Western Europe are 
reflected in the judicial or legislative solutions given in different jurisdictions 
to particular issues regarding religion at school. However, common features are 
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also to be noted, not least because of the convergent effect of the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights. Two particular areas of vivid dispute are 
considered: teaching content (Part III) and religious symbols (Part IV).
Religion at school in most jurisdictions is a subject as such. unsurprisingly, 
many of the debates in our multi-faith European societies focus on the way in 
which the subject, whether described as ‘religious education’ or ‘religious 
instruction’, should be taught (Cumper, for an analysis of European case law 
and Mawhinneyet al. for an empirical study). But religion can also influence the 
syllabus of public schools in separatist systems (Van den Kerchove for France and 
Barendt for the uS) or have repercussions beyond teaching content on other issues 
such as discipline (Cranmer).
Peter Cumper’s chapter offers a study of the challenges presented by the 
provision of religious education in multi-faith and secular European societies. If, 
as he argues, the provision of religious education itself has a lot to offer, notably as 
a way of ‘helping to build bridges between people of different faiths in religiously 
diverse societies’, the question of how it should be provided remains controversial. 
In a European context where, Cumper argues, States are reminded by the European 
Court of Human Rights to be mindful of pupils from minority faiths, the very 
feasibility of the opt-out model may be questioned as inevitably subjecting those 
pupils to the risk of stigmatization. He concludes that the crucial question in the 
coming years may be more about the content (and as a consequence about proper 
funding) of religious educational classes. In crude terms, the options for the future 
lie between a mainly confessional and Christian syllabus or a more comparative 
curriculum inspired by a broad range of religions and beliefs.
Alison mawhinney, ulrike niens, norman Richardson and yuko Chiba 
analyse the implications of the right to opt out from religious education classes 
for minority-belief pupils in Northern Ireland. They reveal that opt-out provisions 
are not the best way to address religious diversity in schools. Even when properly 
implemented – which would require better information for families and good 
quality alternatives for opted-out pupils – opt-out provisions do not fully meet 
minority-belief families’ expectations. Opted-out pupils, especially those of 
a younger age, may feel a sense of marginalization and exclusion. Moreover, 
and more fundamentally, opt-out mechanisms fail positively to recognize and 
value the beliefs of minority families. Rather than to allow pupils to ‘exclude 
themselves’ from religious classes of ‘essentially Christian’ content, a better 
option, Mawhinney et al. argue, would be to redesign the Northern Irish religious 
education syllabus in a more inclusive way.
Anna Van den Kerchove’s analysis reveals that religion is no longer a taboo 
topic in French laïc schools. Now recognized as an integral part of society, 
religious issues appear in most recent history textbooks used in French secondary 
schools. Teachers, though still forbidden to display their own beliefs, may thus 
engage in discussion on religious matters. But this trend in favour of a revival of 
religion mainly benefits Christianity. More is now being said about religion (or 
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rather about religious issues) in French state schools, she concludes; but more 
should also be said and could be better said about non-Christian beliefs.
Eric Barendt’s chapter on teaching evolution, creationism and intelligent 
design in uS schools raises questions which are of particular relevance for 
European debates. The key justification that emerges from uS constitutional case 
law in respect of the presence of religion in state schools is the educational purpose 
it can fulfil. Religious views which are presented in order to ‘inform students and 
promote their understanding of minorities’ would thus comply with such a purpose 
and be held to be constitutional whereas measures which seek to promote religious 
views of the world would not. The analysis of the uS experience, he concludes, 
has a lot to tell us about the interplay of religion, education and the law.
frank Cranmer’s analysis of the Williamson case, its prelude and its aftermath, 
provides clues as to how English courts approach religious questions at school. 
in Williamson, the claimants argued that corporal punishment was an essential 
element of their Evangelical Christian faith and that they should as a consequence 
be allowed to delegate to teachers the right physically to discipline their children. 
The importance of the decision, Cranmer tells us, goes far beyond this simple 
question. The value of the decision lies in the tension it reveals between the 
extreme reluctance of courts to judge the validity of a particular belief on the one 
hand and, on the other, the need to assess whether or not a particular manifestation 
of that belief is sufficiently fundamental as to merit protection. Williamson, he 
concludes, is thus a perfect illustration of and justification for the case-by-case 
approach of common law judges.
Beyond how religion is to be taught at school, the most high-profile cases 
have dealt with how (if at all) religion is to be seen at school, hence a final part on 
religious symbols.
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the new law prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief have been described as the two pillars of twenty-first 
century religion law in Britain.85 The first two chapters confirm the statement in 
relation to religious symbols worn in English and Welsh schools by pupils (Hill, 
in respect of the influence of the human rights era) and by staff (Sandberg, with 
a focus on anti-discrimination law). The third and final chapter addresses legal 
issues raised by religious symbols in German state schools (Lock). Interestingly, 
a human rights discourse in Germany on these matters has developed through a 
national rather than a European impetus.
mark hill’s analysis reveals how English courts have adapted to the 
methodological shift triggered by article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which turned religious freedom into a positive individual right. 
English courts, he observes, tend to adopt a broad approach to what may amount 
to religious beliefs under article 9 paragraph 1 of the Convention and yet often 
conclude that those beliefs have not been interfered with. As illustrated in the case 
of Begum (and others that followed), the House of Lords held that the school’s 
85 Sandberg 2011: 115.
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refusal to allow Miss Begum to wear the jilbab did not interfere with her right to 
religious freedom under article 9(1). Their reasoning was based on the notion of 
the ‘specific situation’, where a person voluntary submits to a particular system of 
rules. That reasoning, Hill suggests, is flawed. A school pupil does not voluntarily 
accept a school uniform policy and there is no contractual relationship between 
school and pupil. A far more satisfactory approach, he concludes, would be to 
abandon the ‘specific situation’ rule and develop reliable criteria for legitimate 
qualifications to religious freedoms under article 9(2).
Russell Sandberg’s chapter on religious symbols worn by staff in British 
schools studies the respective usefulness of article 9 of the ECHR and anti-
discrimination law. Given the broad (and he suggests unfortunate) construction by 
English courts of the ‘specific situation’ rule, claims under article 9 are unlikely 
to succeed. Teachers and other staff, he observes, will typically have agreed to 
restrictions of their religious freedom under their contract of employment and will 
be barred from subsequently claiming that this restriction interferes with their 
article 9 right. Consequently, Sandberg concludes that school employees would be 
better advised to rely upon discrimination law, under which more scope is given 
by English judges to the consideration of the merits of individual cases. However, 
employees who wish to wear symbols which manifest a belief only held by a few 
individuals may find that their claims fall outside the scope of anti-discrimination 
protection. Sandberg is highly critical of this exclusion of those minority beliefs. 
A far better approach, he suggests, would be to abandon distinctions according to 
beliefs and decide all of those claims on the grounds of justification. That would 
allow courts to reach more nuanced decisions, reflecting the context in which the 
claimant operated.
Tobias Lock’s contribution focuses on a few high profile and very instructive 
German constitutional cases relating to religious symbols in German state schools. 
Lock’s analysis reveals the criteria for distinguishing between the treatment of 
static religious symbols such as a cross affixed to the wall of a classroom and 
manifestations of religion at school through prayers or religious education. Whereas 
the former are of a compelling nature because pupils cannot escape from them and 
are thus forced to ‘study under the cross’, the latter can accommodate diverging 
views through opt-out rights. There are also convincing reasons, Lock argues, for 
distinguishing between static religious symbols such as crosses in the classroom 
and portable religious symbols such as Muslim veils worn by teachers or pupils. 
Whereas the former is a direct result of the action of the State, bound by a duty of 
neutrality, the latter involves another crucial dimension: the religious freedom of 
the teacher or pupil concerned. Finally, religious symbols worn by teachers may 
be seen in a different light from religious symbols worn by pupils: because of the 
duty of loyalty owed by teachers to the State, a ban on religious symbols worn 
by teachers will be held constitutional, always provided it has a clear and precise 
legislative basis. The duty of neutrality of the State in matters of religion is not, 
Lock concludes, akin to the concept of laïcité and yet, in respect of teachers at 
least, the situation in many german Länder may be very similar. However, Lock 
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suggests that in Germany similar bans would be more problematic in respect of 
pupils. Moreover, anti-discrimination law may in time provide successful grounds 
for challenge by teachers banned from wearing religious symbols.
Conclusion
The chapters in this collection were assembled with a view to assisting the reader 
in reflecting critically on the extent and meanings that are given to religious 
freedoms at school across Europe. All the contributions reveal that the concept 
of religious freedom is of growing importance in European schools. One may 
legitimately fear that ‘heavy or exclusive focus on the facilitation of religious 
freedom (may) tend to underplay the complexity of broader issues raised by the 
relationship between religion and the law. In particular, such an approach can fail 
to acknowledge sufficiently that more religious freedom for some can come at the 
cost of less freedom for others.’86 However, the present chapters suggest that the 
growing importance of the concept of religious freedoms in Europe is tied to a 
growing balancing process between conflicting rights and viewpoints. The concept 
of religious freedom is thus a counterforce to potentially monolithic assimilationist 
state models of integration, a factor towards increased diversity within individual 
and collective religious identities and an impetus for a methodological shift in 
judicial reasoning. The accommodation of collective religious freedom – and in 
particular the right of ‘faith schools’ in England and Wales – to promote their 
religious ethos must be balanced in each case against the freedom of religion (or 
freedom from religion) of staff. Moreover, the State’s duty to religious neutrality 
or schools’ commitment to community cohesion should only justify infringements 
to individual religious freedom of pupils and staff that are legitimate and 
proportionate. Finally, the religious freedoms of parents (and their ensuing right 
to educate their children according to their own religious beliefs) can come into 
conflict with the religious freedoms of children themselves, as illustrated by the 
Williamson case.87 Of course, this balancing process between state duties and 
individual freedoms, between conflicting collective and individual freedoms or 
between clashing individual religious beliefs always take place in a given national 
model of State/Church relationship. Indeed, the concept of religious freedoms has 
not so far undermined the historical and subtle compromises that the respective 
European States have achieved with the Church or the Churches in the sphere of 
education: from the laïc French model to the religious and segregated approach in 
Northern Ireland, via the denominational but neutral option adopted in Germany 
and Spain and the complex system in England and Wales which combines a non-
denominational but broadly Christian model of non-religious state schools with 
86 McCrea 2010: 1.
87 Note 23 supra. 
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state ‘faith schools’, no model is per se seen as contrary to the demands of religious 
freedoms, as the recent Grand Chamber decision in the Lautsi case88 shows.
Viewed together, these contributions highlight how the relationships between 
individual religious freedoms and collective and state identities or between 
religious freedom and other human rights are the object of an ongoing social 
experiment and underline the difficulties and risks involved in seeking to identify 
the best solution or best model for Europe.
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